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 1 
SYMPOSIUM 
REWRITING JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND THE FEMINIST 
SCHOLARLY PROJECT 
Linda L. Berger, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Bridget J. Crawford* 
In 1995, the authors of a law review article examining “feminist judging” 
focused on the existing social science data concerning women judges and compared 
the voting records and opinions of the only female Justices on the U.S. Supreme 
Court: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O’Connor.1  Based on this review, the 
authors concluded that appointing more women as judges would make little 
difference to judicial outcomes or processes.2  The authors accused those who 
advocated for more women on the bench of having a hidden feminist agenda3 and 
bluntly concluded that “[b]y any measure, feminist judges fit very uneasily in most 
conceptions of the proper role of the judicial system.”4 
More than twenty years later, scholars have a better understanding of what 
constitutes “feminist judging”; moving beyond the gender of those involved in 
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 * Linda Berger is the Family Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law.  Kathryn Stanchi is the Jack E. Feinberg ’57 Professor of 
Litigation and an Affiliated Professor of Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies at Temple 
University Beasley School of Law.  Bridget Crawford is a Professor of Law at the Elisabeth Haub 
School of Law at Pace University. 
 1 Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891, 
919 (1995) (“The weight of the evidence demonstrates that most female judges do not decide cases 
in a distinctively feminist or feminine manner.”); cf. Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Feminist Judging: An 
Introductory Essay, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 609, 610 n.2 (1993) (explaining that the 
concept of “feminist judging” is not confined to women judges but “focuses more on the idea that 
we should move away from traditional legal decisionmaking (which generally promotes white male 
hegemony) and begin to reconstruct our legal system to consider the views of women, people of 
color, gays and lesbians, and other subordinated groups”). 
 2 See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 1, at 899. 
 3 Id. at 892 n.8 (“It is precisely the call for feminist judging, which we think fairly 
characterizes much of the literature advocating more female judges, that bears the brunt of most of 
our criticism.  Nonetheless, our primary concern is with the call for more female judges, regardless 
of whether they purport to have a ‘feminist’ agenda.”). 
 4 Id. at 893. 
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making judgments, feminist judging is understood to derive from the asking of 
feminist questions and the application of feminist theories and methods.  Current 
scholars also are taking a closer look at the role of feminist judicial perspectives 
throughout the judicial system.  Through a series of “feminist judgments” projects 
around the globe,5 scholars are testing the proposition that feminist judging “fits” 
within the judicial role, no matter the gender of the judge.  In the form of rewritten 
opinions based on the facts and precedent in effect at the time of the original 
decision, these projects demonstrate that judges who apply feminist perspectives 
would make a profound difference, not only in the outcomes and processes in 
individual cases, but also in the development of the law.6 
In these projects, feminist judging is recognized as a complex and potentially 
transformative practice.  Thus, as Kathryn Abrams suggested in 1991 about feminist 
lawyering, the effects of feminist judging could be extensive and far reaching.7  
Because legal methods are not set in stone but instead consist of “a partly cohering 
collection of professional practices and argumentative conventions employed by 
those who make their livings as lawyers,” feminist advocates might over time 
“transform not only lawyers’ views of gender justice, but their views of how to use 
law to persuade and produce social change.”8  As Rosemary Hunter wrote more 
recently, such a transformation is possible because feminist judging has both 
substantive and procedural goals: “It aims to achieve gender justice in the outcomes 
of cases as well as in the process of judging, and to consider the effects of decisions 
on broader social relationships.”9 
Beyond the general agreement that feminist judging is not confined to 
decisionmaking by women judges, feminist judging remains difficult to categorize.  
Unlike other jurisprudential approaches, feminism is “a wider social theory and 
 
 5 See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather 
Douglas et al., eds., 2014); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter 
et al., eds., 2010); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND: TE RINO: A TWO-
STRANDED ROPE (Elisabeth McDonald et al., eds., 2017); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN 
OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & 
Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]; NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright et 
al., eds., 2017); Diana Majury, Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CANADIAN J. 
WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2006); Sharon Cowan, Chloë Kennedy & Vanessa Munro, Scottish Feminist 
Judgments Project, U. EDINBURGH: EDINBURGH L. SCH., http://www.sfjp.law.ed.ac.uk/ (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2018); Feminist International Judgments Project: Women’s Voices in International 
Law, U. LEICESTER, http://www2.le.ac.uk/institution/researchimages/feminist-international-
judgments-project-women2019s-voices-in-international-law (last visited Sept. 6, 2018); Jhuma 
Sen et al., The Feminist Judgments Project: India, FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT INDIA, 
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi/call-for-papers (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
 6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
373, 400 (1991). 
 8 Id. at 375. 
 9 Rosemary Hunter et al., Judging in Lower Courts: Conventional, Procedural, Therapeutic 
and Feminist Approaches, 12 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 337, 347 (2016). 
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political practice which seeks to explain the causes of and to remedy women’s 
disadvantages, inequalities and subordination.”10 
Moreover, “feminism” itself comprises a multiplicity of theories, methods, and 
approaches.11  Nonetheless, the organizers of feminist judgments projects agree that 
feminist judgments have some things in common.  These include an awareness of 
the ways in which apparently neutral or objective legal rules and practices have 
varying, and nonneutral, effects on individuals.12  They also include identifying 
whose perspectives are missing from current laws and “incorporating, where 
relevant, the experiences, perspectives and interests of women and other 
traditionally excluded groups into decisionmaking.”13 
Since the 2016 publication of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court,14 much has happened in the United States to make us 
both more and less optimistic about the future incorporation of feminist perspectives 
into judicial opinions.  Systemic barriers to gender justice are being built while 
others are apparently giving way.  For example, even though appointing more 
women judges does not guarantee more feminist judgments, the trend of 
appointments to the federal courts threatens to stall a slow transformation of the 
federal judiciary into a more diverse body.15  After decades of growth in the number 
of newly appointed judges who were women and members of other underrepresented 
groups, President Donald Trump was, as of November 2017, “nominating white men 
to America’s federal courts at a rate not seen in nearly 30 years.”16 
Similarly, using words and phrases typically associated with “feminism,” such 
as “patriarchy” or “sex-role stereotyping,” does not guarantee that feminist 
perspectives will be incorporated into judicial decisionmaking.  Yet its absence is 
 
 10 Id. at 346. 
 11 Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger, Feminist Judging Matters: 
How Feminist Theory and Methods Affect the Process of Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 167, 167–
68 (2018). 
 12 Hunter, Anleu & Mack, supra note 9, at 347; see also Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger 
& Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 3–5 [hereinafter Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project]. 
 13 Hunter et al., supra note 9, at 347 (“The role of a feminist judge is therefore to achieve 
justice by . . . acknowledging and incorporating, where relevant, the experiences, perspectives and 
interests of women and other traditionally excluded groups into decision-making.”); see also 
Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 12, at 3 (describing feminism as 
“a movement and mode of inquiry that has grown to endorse justice for all people, particularly 
those historically oppressed or marginalized by or through law”). 
 14 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5. 
 15 See, e.g., Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Trump’s Judicial Nominations Would 
Put a Lot of White Men on Federal Courts, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/28/this-is-how-trump-is-
changing-the-federal-courts/?utm_term=.4fe9ec061811.  
 16 Catherine Lucey & Meghan Hoyer, Trump Choosing White Men as Judges, Highest Rate 
in Decades, AP NEWS (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/a2c7a89828c747ed9439f60e4a89193e/Trump-choosing-white-men-as-
judges,-highest-rate-in-decades.  According to the Associated Press, “91 percent of Trump’s 
nominees are white, and 81 percent are male . . . .  Three of every four are white men, with few 
African-Americans and Hispanics in the mix.  The last president to nominate a similarly 
homogenous group was George H.W. Bush.”  Id. 
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disheartening all the same.  A recent study found that the words “feminist” and 
“feminism” have been used only once in the content of a Supreme Court majority 
opinion and that feminism has been discussed substantively only twice in any 
Supreme Court opinion.17  At a time when feminist scholarship about the law has 
proliferated, and feminist advocates have made feminist arguments in cases with 
gender implications, the use of feminist vocabulary has declined in both briefs and 
opinions in the federal appellate courts.18  This omission of words or phrases 
typically associated with feminism, let alone the actual words “feminist” or 
“feminism,” suggests that “[feminist] words are not properly within the language of 
law.”19  And this omission is significant because the language of law is a “prestigious 
type of language that must be used if the speaker is to function effectively and to 
which only the most powerful members of society have access.”20 
In the face of barriers in the courts, public movements may advance gender 
justice.21  When the #MeToo movement began, experts pointed out how difficult it 
is to prove sexual harassment in the courts.22  Sandra Sperino and Suja Thomas wrote 
that over the last fifty years, the legal system has increasingly favored “employers 
over employees via a host of procedural, evidentiary and substantive mechanisms.  
Sexual harassment lawsuits are one area where this systematic bias appears; racial 
discrimination lawsuits are another.”23  
The current public discussion may effectively instigate change that the law has 
been unable to achieve.  As Catharine MacKinnon, the lawyer and legal scholar 
largely responsible for the creation of sexual harassment as a cognizable legal 
claim,24 recently wrote:  
 
 17 McKaye L. Neumeister, Note, By Any Other Name: The Vocabulary of “Feminism” at the 
Supreme Court, 29 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 241, 245–46 (2017). 
 18 Id. at 254 (“As of December 2016, 305 opinions from the federal Courts of Appeals use 
the word ‘feminist(s)’ or ‘feminism(s).’  Focusing on a narrower period from 1970 through 2015, 
the Courts of Appeals decided 1,917,930 total cases.  This means that the words ‘feminist’ or 
‘feminism’ appear in only 0.016% of Courts of Appeals decisions in that period.”). 
 19 Id. at 245. 
 20 Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to 
the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 9 (1998). 
 21 An emphasis on culture as a fruitful locus for changing social values is a hallmark of what 
some have called “third-wave feminism.”  See Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist 
Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
99, 162–63 (2007) (“Although third-wave feminists may appear to ignore the law, reject its methods 
or reject its accomplishments, they are very much engaged in a transformative project.  Through 
writing, art, video, dance, and music, third-wave feminists communicate messages about the 
importance of women and their experiences.  This type of cultural work can, in some sense, be seen 
as a necessary pre-condition to an evolution in the law . . . .  [T]hird-wave engagement with culture 
may be a precursor to the law’s adoption of some third-wave feminist ideas.”). 
 22 Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab Your Breasts?  That’s Not (Legally) 
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html. 
 23 Id.; see also SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S 
COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017). 
 24 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A 
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); see also Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women’s 
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#MeToo, this uprising of the formerly disregarded, . . . has made untenable the 
assumption that the one who reports sexual abuse is a lying slut, and that is 
changing everything already.  Sexual harassment law prepared the ground, but it 
is today’s movement that is shifting gender hierarchy’s tectonic plates.25 
According to MacKinnon, the “unprecedented wave of speaking out in conventional 
and social media . . . is eroding the two biggest barriers to ending sexual harassment 
in law and in life: the disbelief and trivializing dehumanization of its victims.”26 
Thus, as MacKinnon explains, changes in the law had to come first in order to 
make it possible to conceive of sexual violations in terms of inequality.  Over time, 
however, those changes were not enough.  According to MacKinnon, because 
“[p]owerful individuals and entities are [now] taking sexual abuse seriously . . . and 
acting against it as never before . . . survivors are initiating consequences none of 
them could have gotten through any lawsuit.”27  Even more significantly, if the 
movement shifts society’s norms over the long term, those norms may eventually be 
incorporated into the law. 
In this context, we welcome the following nine reviews of and responses to 
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, a 
volume we edited that included twenty-five rewritten decisions and commentary on 
each rewritten opinion.  The book project involved over fifty contributors, including 
legal scholars from all corners of the academy, as well as practicing attorneys.28  The 
following reviews are from a wide array of authors from various disciplines; they 
include law professors, a former judge, practicing attorneys, and a political scientist.  
These diverse reviewers engage with the book from a number of varying 
perspectives, with some focusing on doctrine, others on theory, and still others on 
process.  The end result is a rich and comprehensive look at the volume whose 
alternative judgments might have resulted in transformative legal and cultural shifts 
in the United States in terms of gender equality.  Widening the scope of alternative 
judgments, the volume of rewritten opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court has 
inspired a series of subject-matter specific books that are forthcoming from 
Cambridge University Press.29 
First among the following reviews is one that illustrates the importance of 
incorporating feminist perspectives into judgments on women’s rights in the 
workplace.  Gillian Thomas, an attorney with the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, 
touches on several of the volume’s rewritten feminist judgments, including Muller 
 
Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 42–43 (1990) (describing Professor 
MacKinnon’s development of the legal claim of sexual harassment). 
 25 Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5. 
 29 The first book in the series has been published.  See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN 
TAX OPINIONS (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017).  There is approval in place 
or concrete plans for volumes that focus on Reproductive Justice, Torts, Corporations, Trusts and 
Estates, Employment Discrimination, and Family Law.  See Series Projects, THE U.S. FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS PROJECT, https://sites.temple.edu/usfeministjudgments/projects/ (last visited Sept. 6, 
2018). 
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v. Oregon,30 Geduldig v. Aiello,31 and Dothard v. Rawlinson.32  Of each of these 
feminist judgments, Thomas says that they offer “invaluable lessons to today’s 
practitioners” about the importance of telling clients’ stories “to judges who 
themselves may be years, even decades, away from ‘real’ jobs, and who have 
remained isolated from the realities of working women’s lives.”33  Thomas explores 
the ways in which the gendered nature of work is a “construct of assumptions, 
stereotypes, and anachronistic traditions.”34 
Law professors Sandra Sperino and Elizabeth Kukura focus on the doctrinal 
transformation in two critical feminist judgments: Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins35 
and Roe v. Wade.36  Professor Sperino makes the case that Professor Martha 
Chamallas’s rewrite of Price Waterhouse would have worked a sea change for future 
Title VII jurisprudence.37  In particular, Sperino praises the rewritten opinion for 
moving the law beyond the inflammatory comments made to and about Ann 
Hopkins.  While these comments—which included remarks that Hopkins should 
have gone to “charm school” and should walk and talk more “femininely”—
undoubtedly helped Ann Hopkins as an individual plaintiff, they loomed so large in 
the original Price Waterhouse decision that future plaintiffs had difficulty proving 
discrimination in the absence of similarly outrageous comments.38 
Sperino points out that Chamallas’s rewrite emphasizes not the specific 
comments per se, but the structural discrimination at Price Waterhouse—an 
embedded and systematic misogyny of which the comments were merely a 
symptom.39  This doctrinal shift would have encouraged lower courts to look 
underneath the surface of discriminatory workplace behavior to discover what 
structures put in place by the employer enabled and encouraged the behavior.  
Sperino also praises the feminist judgment for its rejection of the judge-made 
dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate treatment cases.40  In Sperino’s 
view, Title VII does not distinguish these two kinds of cases and thus Chamallas’s 
opinion is truer to the statutory text. 
 
 30 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Rewritten Opinion in Muller v. Oregon, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 5, at 83, 83–97. 
 31 Lucinda M. Finley, Rewritten Opinion in Geduldig v. Aiello, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 5, at 190, 190–207. 
 32 Maria L. Ontiveros, Rewritten Opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 213, 213–27. 
 33 Gillian Thomas, Feminist Judgments and Women’s Rights at Work, 94 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. ONLINE 12, 12 (2018).  
 34 Id. at 16.  
 35 Martha Chamallas, Rewritten Opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 345, 345–60. 
 36 Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Rewritten Opinion in Roe v. Wade, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 5, at 151, 151–67. 
 37 Sandra Sperino, Feminist Judgments and the Rewritten Price Waterhouse, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 17, 17–19 (2018).  
 38 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
 39 Sperino, supra note 37, at 17–18.  
 40 Id. at 18.  
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Law professor Elizabeth Kukura takes a similarly future-looking approach to 
her evaluation of Kimberly Mutcherson’s Roe v. Wade.41  Kukura emphasizes the 
critical importance of Mutcherson’s rejection of “viability” as the point at which the 
state’s interest in the life of the fetus becomes compelling.  She also commends 
Mutcherson for grounding women’s reproductive rights in the Equal Protection 
Clause as well as privacy.42  For Kukura, what many see as a mere academic debate 
has serious, real-world consequences, not just for women who wish to obtain an 
abortion, but also acutely for women who wish to give birth on their own terms.  
Kukura focuses on cases referred to as “obstetric violence,” in which pregnant 
women who wish to control the means of giving birth are coerced, and sometimes 
physically forced, to undergo procedures against their will.  She tells the story of a 
woman who wished to have a vaginal birth for her second child after delivering her 
first child by cesarean section.  The woman was literally forced down by medical 
personnel and made to endure a cesarean section.43  For this woman, and all women 
who wish to make free choices about reproduction, the doctrinal basis for Roe is not 
solely an academic question. 
In her review essay, law professor Noa Ben-Asher notes a doctrinal move that 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig makes in her feminist rewrite of Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson,44 but Ben-Asher’s primary focus is on the theoretical.  Specifically, she 
observes that Onwuachi-Willig’s Meritor would have moved discrimination 
jurisprudence away from the liberal feminism that has dominated the discourse since 
the 1970s toward an antisubordination theory.45  Again, this shift in Onwuachi-
Willig’s rewrite is theoretical, but the practical consequences are undeniable.  In 
Onwuachi-Willig’s reimagined majority opinion, the theoretical shift causes Title 
VII sexual harassment law to focus on the behavior of the accuser, not the behavior 
of the victim.46  The impact of such a shift would have been immense, requiring 
lower courts to scrutinize employer and worker behavior without resort to “victim 
blaming.”  As Ben-Asher points out, the transformation that Onwuachi-Willig made 
to the law in her feminist judgment resonates with calls from the current #MeToo 
movement and others to require affirmative consent for sexual relations.47  But the 
law still lags behind, embracing a liberal model of feminism that, because it assumes 
unconstrained choice and a balance of power between fully informed legal actors, 
requires asking questions about why a woman did not report, leave her job, or resist. 
In their response to the rewritten Loving v. Virginia opinion of Professor Teri 
McMurtry-Chubb,48 former Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court Leah Ward 
 
 41 Mutcherson, supra note 36, at 151–67. 
 42 Elizabeth Kukura, Revisiting Roe to Advance Reproductive Justice for Childbearing 
Women, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 20, 20, 23 (2018).  
 43 Id. at 20–22.  
 44 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Rewritten Opinion in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 303, 303–21. 
 45 Noa Ben-Asher, How Is Sex Harassment Discriminatory?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
ONLINE 25, 25–27 (2018).  
 46 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 44, at 315. 
 47 Ben-Asher, supra note 45, at 27.  
 48 Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 119, 119–36. 
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Sears and her colleague Sasha Greenberg focus on the story of Mildred Jeter and 
Richard Loving rather than the legal history that is the backbone of the rewritten 
opinion.49  Though Sears and Greenberg agree that both the original U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion and McMurtry-Chubb’s feminist judgment were correct in centering 
their legal conclusions on the legacy of White supremacy, Sears and Greenberg place 
their emphasis elsewhere.  Their response highlights the family and individual lives 
that were at risk because of the Virginia statute.50  Sears and Greenberg also 
emphasize developments that show society’s growing recognition of the artificiality 
of racial barriers, which they find suggestive of the legal evolution that might be 
brought about by cultural changes over time.51 
Political scientist Claire Wofford and Australian law professors Gabrielle 
Appleby and Rosalind Dixon approach their reviews largely from a procedural 
perspective.  Both reviews tackle the concept of the book as a whole, as contrasted 
with the reviews that focus on a single case.  Wofford acknowledges the 
groundbreaking nature of the book, but wonders whether the sole focus on judicial 
decisionmaking is flawed.52  She points out that gender subordination comes into 
play well before a decision is written, at least as early as the decision to file the 
case.53  She cites a study that shows women are less likely to litigate than men and 
so are underrepresented in judicial decisions.54  This result also suggests that the 
cases we do see about gender discrimination are statistical outliers.  
Similarly, Professors Appleby and Dixon praise the breadth of the cases 
covered by the book, but see the book as primarily of interest to scholars and 
academics.  As a teaching tool, the book is, in their view, too diverse and unwieldy 
to be easily digested by students.55  They contrast the twenty-five cases in the 
Feminist Judgments book with their own volume, The Critical Judgments Project: 
Re-reading Monis v The Queen,56 in which several authors rewrite the same case.57  
Appleby and Dixon make a compelling argument that students can more readily 
digest rewritten opinions if they are all of the same case.58  Appleby and Dixon also 
suggest that diverse perspectives on one case have greater pedagogical value than a 
volume of disparate rewritten opinions insofar as multiple rewritings of the same 
case are more likely to demonstrate to students the wide variety in critical legal 
thinking.59  They emphasize that their approach, which takes a critical legal stance 
 
 49 Leah Ward Sears & Sasha N. Greenberg, The Love in Loving: Overcoming Artificial 
Racial Barriers, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 28, 29–30 (2018).  
 50 Id. at 30.  
 51 Id. at 30–31.  
 52 Claire B. Wofford, Looking to the Litigant: Reaction Essay to Feminist Judgments: 
Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 32, 33 
(2018).  
 53 Id. at 34. 
 54 Id. at 34–35.  
 55 Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon, Extending the Critical Re-reading Project, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 37, 39 (2018).  
 56 THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT: RE-READING MONIS V THE QUEEN (Gabrielle 
Appleby & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2016). 
 57 Appleby & Dixon, supra note 55, at 39.  
 58 Id. at 39–43.  
 59 Id. at 43.  
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as opposed to a feminist one, is better suited to teaching students that legal reasoning 
is an exercise in standpoint and perspective.60 
By contrast, Sarah Weddington, the attorney who argued Roe v. Wade before 
the Supreme Court of the United States and an ongoing leader in the fight for 
reproductive rights, sees the Feminist Judgments book as a clarion call to young 
women, particularly law students, to fight for justice.61  Weddington, who argued 
Roe at just twenty-six years old, is thought to be the youngest person to successfully 
argue a Supreme Court case.62  In her review essay, she notes that activism takes 
confidence and passion.63  Successful activists also need role models and mentors—
someone to tell a young person she can do it, and that she should do it.  In 
Weddington’s case, her clients encouraged her to fight to argue the case, even though 
an older, more experienced man wanted to take the case from her when it got to the 
Supreme Court.64  She encourages young people to use Feminist Judgments as a way 
to gain confidence, to seek out causes that inspire them, and to find the mentors and 
role models on whose shoulders they can stand.65 
Law professor Margaret Johnson’s review essay concludes the collection, 
again by addressing the process of writing alternative judgments.  She focuses on 
the expanded role of narrative as integral to a more just judicial process.66  Johnson 
observes that most of the rewritten opinions in the book alter or expand the narratives 
of the original opinions.67  In this way, the opinions disrupt the perception that the 
published opinion is the only story, and the only acceptable account of what 
happened in the case.  She, like Ben-Asher, refers to the #MeToo movement, but 
Johnson’s emphasis is on #MeToo as a narrative movement that, like the rewritten 
opinions, uses storytelling to undercut the power of the status quo.  Johnson’s review 
first embraces the concept of the book as a whole, and she then uses Ann McGinley’s 
rewritten opinion of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.68 as an example 
of how expanded narrative can dispute the law’s priorities and biases.69 
These review essays are thoughtful, thought provoking, and challenge all who 
are engaged in Feminist Judgments projects around the globe70 to consider the 
effectiveness of rewriting judicial opinions as a form of scholarship, a pedagogical 
tool, or even an exercise in activism.  A variety of questions common to all of the 
 
 60 Id. at 38–39.  
 61 Sarah Weddington, Feminist Judgments and the Future of Reproductive Justice, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 44, 45 (2018).  
 62 See, e.g., Sarah Weddington, Reflections on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Roe v. Wade, 
62 ALB. L. REV. 811, 811 n.* (1999) (author’s note describing Ms. Weddington as the attorney 
who “successfully argued the winning side of the landmark 1973 case of Roe v. Wade and is thought 
to be the youngest person to win a case before the United States Supreme Court”). 
 63 Weddington, supra note 61, at 46.  
 64 Id. at 48.  
 65 Id. at 50.  
 66 Margaret E. Johnson, Feminist Judgments & #MeToo, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 
51, 51–54 (2018).  
 67 Id. at 52–54. 
 68 Ann C. McGinley, Rewritten Opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 414, 414–25. 
 69 Johnson, supra note 66, at 51–54.  
 70 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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global feminist judgments are ripe for further inquiry.  First, we come back to the 
question that started this Essay: Can feminist judging “fit” the “proper role of the 
judicial system”?71  We believe that the opinions in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten 
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court answer that question with a resounding 
“yes,” but we recognize that the question is still a matter of some controversy.72 
This broader question raises numerous corollary questions.  If a judge 
incorporates feminist perspectives into her judicial opinion, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, is she more likely to be considered “biased” than a judge who 
incorporates, say, a particular religious perspective into his judicial opinion?  Why 
does the feminist perspective indicate (to some) a built-in bias,73 but a Law and 
Economics perspective does not?74  Given the possibility of being accused of bias, 
how likely is it that a judge will reveal himself to be a feminist?75  Why does (or 
should) such a revelation matter (or not), given that no judge can check his or her 
personal life experience at the door to the courthouse?  Finally, is feminism as an 
analytic tool capacious enough to highlight bias in the law that is based on race, 
gender, sex, sexuality, ethnicity, class, nationality, language, culture, ability, 
 
 71 Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 1, at 893. 
 72 See id. at 892.  In 1990, Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate John Silber stated that he 
would not appoint Gloria Steinem to be a judge because men would not get a fair hearing before 
her.  Fox Butterfield, Silber Taps Public’s Anger to Run a Strong Race in Massachusetts, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/27/us/silber-taps-public-s-anger-to-run-
a-strong-race-in-massachusetts.html.  And, more recently, in 2013, Republicans blocked the 
judicial appointment of Nina Pillard to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, based in part on 
her “militant feminism.”  Dana Liebelson, The Republican Freakout Over This Feminist, Pro-
Choice Federal Judicial Nominee, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/11/republicans-nina-pillard-dc-circuit-confirmation/. 
 73 See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 1, at 896. 
 74 See, e.g., Mason Judicial Education Program, MASON L. & ECON. CTR., 
http://masonlec.org/divisions/mason-judicial-education-program/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018) (“For 
over four decades, the LEC’s Judicial Education Program has helped train the nation’s judges and 
justices in basic economics, accounting, statistics, regulatory analysis, and other related disciplines.  
The Program offers intellectually rigorous, balanced, and timely education programs to the nation’s 
judges and justices in the belief that the fundamental principles of a free and just society depend on 
a knowledgable [sic] and well educated judiciary.”).  If this reasoning applies to any perspective-
based analysis, then presumably judicial education in feminist theories and methods should be 
equally welcome. 
 75 For two examples of judges who openly have embraced the feminist label, see Brenda 
Hale, Foreword, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 5, at v.  Lady 
Hale became the first female president of the UK Supreme Court in 2017.  See Haroon Siddique, 
Brenda Hale Appointed as U.K. Supreme Court’s First Female President, GUARDIAN (July 21, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jul/21/brenda-hale-appointed-as-uk-supreme-
court-first-female-president; see also Erika Rackley, What a Difference Difference Makes: 
Gendered Harms and Judicial Diversity, in WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY 36 (Ulrike Shultz & Gisela 
Shaw eds., 2012) (describing criticism of Australian judge who self-identified as a feminist at her 
swearing-in ceremony); cf. Heather Roberts, Ceremony Matters: The Lasting Significance of the 
Swearing-In Ceremony of Chief Justice Susan Kiefel, AUSTL. PUB. L. (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://auspublaw.org/2017/02/ceremony-matters/ (noting that Kiefel is the first woman to hold the 
position of the Chief Justice of the (Australia) High Court, and that four speakers at the ceremony 
referred to her Honour’s identity as a woman, but that Chief Justice Kiefel herself preferred to 
“minimise allusions to her gender in her speech”). 
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immigration status, and religion?  As editors of the Feminist Judgments Series,  we 
believe that feminist perspectives are multiple and far from monolithic.76  In their 
best iterations, feminisms should advocate for all historically disadvantaged people.  
Our greatest hope is that Feminist Judgments will encourage students, lawyers, 
judges, law professors, and members of the public to understand that the law’s future 
trajectory is not etched in stone.  We turn toward the future with a hope for a more 
inclusive and just legal system. 
 
 76 See Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 12, at 3–4 (“[W]hen 
we refer to feminist methods or feminist reasoning processes, we mean ‘methods’ and ‘reasoning 
processes’ plural, all the while acknowledging that there is a rich and diverse body of scholarship 
that has flourished under the over-arching label ‘feminist legal theory.’”).  Although, as editors, we 
left it to all contributors to define feminism for themselves, our own view is stated explicitly in the 
introduction to Feminist Judgments.  See id. 
